When the flag says NATO but the signals don’t: Albania’s ambiguity, Russia’s asset

Albania talks NATO while enabling Belgrade’s leverage and ports. From ‘cement’ cargos to status-neutral diplomacy, Tirana’s performance masks outcomes that serve Moscow and imperil Kosovo.

Albanian law enforcement detained a tanker suspected of illegally transporting Russian oil in violation of Western sanctions,” reported European Pravda in February 2023¹, after police impounded a Libya-flagged vessel at Porto Romano with 22,500 tonnes of oil under falsified documents. Investigators believed the cargo had been transferred ship-to-ship near Greece before slipping into Albania.

Two and a half years on, that episode looks less like an outlier than an overture. This autumn, an investigation by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network described how sanctioned, low-grade fuel from Russia and Libya has been funneled into Europe through Albanian ports, disguised as “cement” or hidden in refitted hulls, with forged declarations and lax checks doing the rest. Within days, Ukrainian outlets amplified the findings, naming Porto Romano and detailing voyages by the Besart and the Aya Zanoubya that, on paper, carried building materials but in fact held hundreds of thousands of litres of undeclared diesel².

Albania’s government rejects the idea of complicity; yet the pattern that emerges at sea is mirrored on land, in the country’s posture towards Serbia and Kosovo. At its most charitable, that posture is the language of “pragmatism”; at its most honest, it is a politics of accommodation that consistently benefits Belgrade. For a NATO³ member that markets itself as a Western anchor in the Adriatic⁴, the dissonance between rhetoric and policy has grown too conspicuous to ignore.

🇺🇦 Ukrainian Coverage: A Timeline

Ukrainian outlets have traced Russian oil evasion since 2023, highlighting ship-to-ship blending, third-country relabelling, and allegations that Albanian ports enable sanctioned fuel to reach markets.

• May 25, 2023 — ZN.UA (Mirror of the Week).
  A data-rich analysis warned that ship-to-ship (STS) blending and third-country relabelling were enabling Russian diesel to re-enter Europe via hubs off Greece, Gibraltar and Togo, with Turkey and Morocco emerging as pivotal waypoints.

• Oct. 4, 2025 — Ukrainska Pravda (Eng.).
  Kyiv reported the EU was preparing legal grounds to interdict Russia’s “shadow fleet” tankers in the Baltic, signalling sharper European enforcement against sanction-dodging maritime logistics.

• Oct. 14, 2025 — Balkan Insight (baseline for later UA coverage).
  While not Ukrainian media, this BIRN investigation became the basis for multiple Ukrainian write-ups alleging Albanian ports as entry points for sanctioned Russian/Libyan fuel disguised as other cargo.

• Oct. 15, 2025 — RBC-Ukraine.
  Citing BIRN, RBC-Ukraine said Albania is helping Russia sell oil through a “network of schemes,” naming Porto Romano and detailing “cement” cover loads and refitted hulls used to move undeclared diesel.

• Oct. 15, 2025 — Komersant Ukrainian.
  Expanded the Albania angle: described old, Tanzania-flagged vessels, forged customs declarations, and flows from Benghazi, Libya, into Albanian ports—then onward into the EU.

• Oct. 16, 2025 — Ukrainska Pravda (Eng.).
  Ukraine’s military intelligence published dossiers on 139 vessels and 142 captains involved in moving sanctioned Russian/Iranian oil and stolen Ukrainian grain—contextualising the broader network into which the Albania routes allegedly feed.

• Oct. 15–17, 2025 — PRM.ua (Pryamyi).
  Ran a straight “investigation” brief in English asserting Albania had become a trans-shipment point for smuggled Russian oil, tying in UN figures on Benghazi-origin tankers and Russian-Libyan coordination.

A year of smoke and mirrors

From the moment the EU’s embargo on Russian petroleum products took full effect in February 2023, Moscow’s workarounds proliferated, blending at sea, relabelling in third countries, certificates that told tidy stories⁵. Analysts in Kyiv tracked the flows, the spike in ship-to-ship transfers, the use of transit hubs whose documents travel faster than molecules and warned that “clean” fuel was re-entering European markets through a series of convenient fictions. Albania, with a private terminal at Porto Romano, sits on the seam between declared intent and practical reality.

The Queen Majeda case⁶ underscores the point. In September 2022, Albanian authorities detained the Benghazi-origin tanker and later documented marine gasoil that should not have been circulating in Albania at all. Subsequent reporting traced the ship’s port calls and ship-to-ship activity, Ukrainian media this month recalled that the official recipient listed in paperwork was a prominent Albanian importer, denials duly issued while emphasising that the structural weakness lay in the route, the documentation and the oversight⁷.

This is not a story solely about cargoes. It is about a governing reflex. Albania’s outward-facing line since Russia’s full-scale invasion has been impeccably Euro-Atlantic: the Kucova air base refitted for NATO, ministerial photo ops with allied hardware, regular reminders that Tirana has been in the alliance since 2009. The performance is real enough. But regional policy, particularly towards Kosovo, keeps pointing in another direction.

The Belgrade tilt

The hinge year was 2023. In June, after weeks of tension in northern Kosovo, Edi Rama announced he had drafted a statute for the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities (ASM) and circulated it to European capitals⁸. The initiative was presented as a technocratic fix. In practice, it bypassed Pristina⁹ and landed as a status-neutral architecture that strengthened Belgrade’s leverage without requiring recognition of Kosovo’s sovereignty. Western officials were tight-lipped; in Pristina, the response was blunt, this is not how you treat an ally.

That tilt matters because Serbia, ever since signing a foreign-policy “alignment” agreement with Moscow in September 2022¹⁰, has operated as the Kremlin’s most reliable vector in the Western Balkans, blocking sanctions, nurturing energy dependence and instrumentalising tensions in Kosovo’s north. When President Aleksandar Vucic chose Moscow’s 80th Victory Day parade¹¹ this May over European sensibilities, he did so knowing precisely the message it sent.

In June, at President Zelensky’s Ukraine–Southeast Europe summit in Odesa¹², Vucic refused to sign the joint declaration condemning Russia’s aggression¹³, boasting afterwards that he had “not betrayed Russia”¹⁴. The symbolism was unmissable, so too was the choreography. Kosovo was not present. The stagecraft an appeal to European solidarity that accommodated the Kremlin’s closest Balkan partner while excluding the region’s most besieged democracy left Kyiv defending a diplomatic choice that Belgrade promptly pocketed.

Throughout, Tirana struck the note of the concerned neighbour, urging calm, proposing conferences, insisting on dialogue. The cost of those gestures, however, has been borne disproportionately by Pristina, a drip-feed normalisation of Serbian vetoes over Kosovo’s internal arrangements, smuggled in under the banner of “regional integration”.

🇦🇱 Albanian Moves Viewed as Undercutting Kosovo: A Timeline

A chronological digest of Albanian decisions, Open Balkan advocacy, ASM draft, SHISH appointment, genocide resolution defeat seen by Pristina as strengthening Belgrade’s leverage while straining Kosovo–Albania alignment.

• 21 Mar 2019 — Signals on land-swap | Koha Ditore / Telegrafi
  In a Swiss NZZ interview, Edi Rama appeared open to Kosovo–Serbia border changes, calling them “a natural thing,” per Albanian reprints and summaries.

  • 25 Oct 2019 — Lawsuit announced | Balkan Insight
    Rama says he will sue former Kosovo PM Ramush Haradinaj for defamation over land-swap allegations.

  • 16 Jan 2020 — Case filed in Pristina | Pristina Insight / RFE/RL
    Rama files the suit at the Pristina Basic Court; outlets confirm the court’s receipt.

  • 30 Jun 2020 — Suit withdrawn | Alb Gov / Telegrafi
    Rama publicly announces he is dropping the case; local outlets report the withdrawal the same day.

• 2019–2021 — “Open Balkan” push with Belgrade | Kosovo 2.0
  Prime Minister Edi Rama champions the Mini-Schengen/“Open Balkan” project alongside Aleksandar Vucic and Zoran Zaev. Kosovo refuses to join on status-neutral grounds, warning it entrenches Serbian leverage without recognition.

• Mar–Apr 2023 — Kosovo intel official tapped to run SHISH | Euro News
  Rama proposes, and President Bajram Begaj decrees, Vlora Hyseni—recently removed as Kosovo’s deputy intelligence chief as director of Albania’s State Intelligence Service (SHISH). The move draws criticism in Prishtina and questions over vetting and loyalty standards.

• 8–9 June 2023 — Rama’s ASM draft bypasses Prishtina | Euro News
  Rama presents to Paris and Berlin a draft statute for Kosovo’s Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities (ASM). Western capitals stay “tight-lipped”; Kosovo voices concern at being side-stepped on a sovereignty question.

• 19 July 2023 — Tirana–Prishtina rift on Serbia policy | Balkan Insight
  Reporting highlights a deepening feud between Rama and Kosovo PM Albin Kurti, fuelled by Rama’s amicable rapport with Vucic and advocacy of initiatives viewed in Prishtina as status-neutral or Serbia-tilted.

• 11 June 2025 — Odesa summit optics | The GPC Politics / AP / Kyiv Ind
  At Ukraine’s Southeast Europe summit, Serbia’s president refuses to sign the anti-Russia declaration. Albania participates; Kosovo is not at the table—an episode critics in Prishtina cite as emblematic of regional choreography favouring Belgrade. (Serbia’s refusal documented; Kosovo’s exclusion and Albanian stance are matters of political contention.)

• 16 Oct 2025 — Parliament blocks genocide resolution | DTT / Koha
  Albania’s ruling majority rejects an opposition motion to recognise Serbian crimes in Kosovo as genocide, despite calls to align with Prishtina’s position.

• 17 Oct 2025 — Government-backed protest against the Hague court | AP
  Tirana hosts a large rally against the EU-backed Kosovo Specialist Chambers; coverage notes Albanian government support for the demonstration, which critics say undermines Kosovo’s justice commitments while aiding Belgrade’s narrative.

The intelligence question

Nothing captures the contradiction more sharply than the appointment of Vlora Hyseni, formerly a senior figure in Kosovo’s intelligence apparatus, removed there amid political churn as director of Albania’s SHISH in 2023. The move was legal, allies photographed themselves offering congratulations. But from the outset it raised quiet questions in European security circles about vetting, loyalty and optics, questions compounded by opposition claims, publicly aired by former prime minister Sali Berisha of an early, discreet visit to Belgrade. Those claims have not been substantiated; nonetheless, the optics alone were striking for a NATO service head in a season of Serbian brinkmanship.

Here again, the pattern is less conspiracy than complacency: Albania insists it is a pillar of the Euro-Atlantic order—true enough—and yet repeatedly takes steps that soften the ground for Belgrade’s agenda, and by extension, Moscow’s.

Albania’s contradictions crystallise in one decision in 2023 Edi Rama installed Vlora Hyseni, dismissed in June 2021 as deputy head of Kosovo’s intelligence agency under classified provisions as director of SHISH by presidential decree, with no visible parliamentary scrutiny. The appointment may be lawful, but it raises three hard questions Tirana has not answered: Was there rigorous, documented vetting? Does Hyseni hold Albanian citizenship (a live issue given Law 65/2014’s requirement of “loyalty to the Republic”)? And why entrust a NATO service to a recent foreign senior from a parallel service next door?

Opposition claims most prominently from former prime minister Sali Berisha allege¹⁵ an early Belgrade visit and mishandling of data. These remain unverified and should be treated as such. What is indisputable is the optics, a foreign national, removed in Prishtina under secrecy provisions, reappears in Tirana at the apex of a NATO intelligence service with minimal transparency amid Serbian brinkmanship.

Separately, multiple sources told Gunpowder Chronicles that Hyseni’s first official trip in office was to Belgrade and that her Kosovo dismissal followed allegations of trading state secrets with Serbia—Kosovo’s principal adversary¹⁶. We have not independently verified these assertions and relevant offices declined to comment. Still, veteran practitioners in London note a hard convention: a new intelligence chief’s first foreign call signals alignment.

“Your first stop is the ally you mean to reassure,” a former European service head said. “If that stop is Belgrade, the message writes itself.”

This is not a footnote, it is a pattern. Albania talks the Euro-Atlantic language, yet it repeatedly takes steps that ease Belgrade’s hand. The Hyseni appointment fits that drift, secrecy over scrutiny, patronage over process, and optics that erode confidence precisely where Moscow trades in ambiguity. In a region where trust is the scarcest commodity, Tirana cannot afford to mistake performance for policy.

Field notes from a year on the road

In late 2022, having spent a year reporting Russia’s war in Ukraine, I was dispatched to the Western Balkans with a simple, dispiriting hypothesis, after Belgrade signed its foreign-policy alignment with Moscow, Serbia would test the region, creating distractions closer to Europe while helping Russia reroute commerce and attention. I had read my Ukrainian colleagues’ warnings and exchanged notes with editors in Kyiv. By May–June 2024, I was trying to see the logistics up close.

In Montenegro, where I’d heard whispers of Chinese matériel moving through Kotor, unknown assailants removed my front licence plate during a short stop, and a London contact quietly urged me to leave. In Albania, after hours at Durres port observing an area of interest, I noticed a car sitting too long in the mirror. Back in Tirana that night, both tyres on one side were flat. The next morning, heading for Kosovo, the car began to wobble, a quick check showed wheel bolts loosened. I tightened them, drove on, only for the problem to recur in Kosovo, a mechanic told me puzzled that the bolts themselves looked as if they were degrading.

This May, after we published a piece on Hyseni’s tenure and first-months diplomacy, I set out for Ukraine. Somewhere in Poland the car went from uneasy to dangerous. In Lviv, a garage kept it a week, brake lines pitted with small punctures, wheel-well rubbers sliced, even the main driveshaft compromised. I am not drawing forensic conclusions, I am describing a climate. In parts of the Balkans, to ask the wrong question is to be told, gently or otherwise, that you are being watched.

The sleeping bear

Albania’s admirers will say correctly that the country has invested in NATO, opened its runways to allied jets, partnered with Italy on maritime patrols¹⁷ and handled its share of Western crises with competence. That is true. It is also true that policy is judged not only in Brussels but where it lands, in Mitrovica and Leposavic, on the quays at Durres and Porto Romano, in the courier pouches that carry drafts of “solutions” to European capitals without the courtesy of showing them first to Pristina.

Seen from Kyiv, the broader picture is painfully familiar. A Kremlin-aligned power uses fuel, paperwork and “neutral” language to bend a region’s geometry; neighbouring states speak the language of stability while accommodating the destabiliser and a network of ports, flags and shell companies turns sanctions into a maze rather than a wall. Albania is not the architect of that playbook. But in 2023–25 it has too often been the stagehand present at the key moments, saying the right things, and then doing just enough of the wrong ones to make Belgrade’s life easier.

The oil flows tell one story. The Odesa summit tells another. The ASM draft tells a third. Together, they map a line that runs counter to the country’s self-portrait. A NATO member can, of course, make mistakes, it can misjudge the speed of events; it can be outmanoeuvred by a neighbour that revels in ambiguity. What it cannot do without consequence is confuse performance for policy.

The embarrassment for Europe is that the contradiction is happening inside the tent. Albania’s ports and politics, Albanian drafts and Albanian silences, now matter as much to Kosovo’s hard edge of sovereignty as any communiqués issued in Brussels. For a continent professing strategic clarity, it is a luxury it can no longer afford to ignore.

In sum, the pattern is no longer deniable. From the Porto Romano oil cases and “cement” cargos, to the Open Balkan push that normalised status-neutrality, to the ASM draft routed around Pristina, to Odesa’s choreography where Belgrade was indulged and Kosovo absent, and finally to the SHISH appointment of a recently dismissed Kosovar intelligence official, all while parliament binned a genocide resolution, Albania’s practice has repeatedly advantaged Serbia and, by extension, Moscow. The government’s Euro-Atlantic showcase in Kuçova, and joint patrols, summit rhetoric cannot mask outcomes that undercut Kosovo’s sovereignty, launder sanctioned fuel into European supply chains, and soften the region’s resistance to Kremlin method. If Tirana is the anchor it claims, it should welcome hard conditionality, transparent port audits and cargo tracing, full disclosure of SHISH vetting and legal status, alignment with EU sanctions enforcement without status-neutral hedging, and a public reset that treats Kosovo as an ally rather than a negotiating counterweight. Absent that, Albania remains the contradiction within the tent, performing Western fidelity, delivering Belgrade latitude, and giving Russia precisely what it prizes most in the Balkans: ambiguity that works.

1. В Албанії затримали танкер, який може нелегально перевозити російську нафту — European Pravda.

2. Albania Emerges as Destination Port for Illicit Oil from Russia and Libya — Balkan Insight.

3. Albania and Croatia joined NATO 15 years ago — NATO.

4. Albania turns an old Soviet-era air base into a regional hub of NATO air operations — AP.

5. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with Kommersant, Moscow, October 15, 2025 — MFA Russian Federation.

6. The Odyssey of the Queen Majeda — Libya Tribune.

7. Albania has become a new hub for smuggling Russian oil: how the Kremlin circumvents sanctions — Komersant Ukraine.

8. West tight lipped on Albanian PMs draft for Association of Serb Municipalities in Kosovo — Euractiv.

9. Expert criticizes Rama’s proposal for Association of Serb Municipalities in Kosovo — Euro News Albania.

10. EU candidate Serbia and Russia sign foreign policy agreement — AP.

11. Vucic Attends Moscow Victory Parade Amid Barrage of EU Criticism

Serbia’s president attended Putin’s Victory Day parade in Moscow. But senior EU figures said his decision to be there could have consequences. — Balkan Insight.

12. Zelensky’s Odessa Summit: A Stage for Surrender

Zelensky begged the West for solidarity, then bowed to Putin’s puppet. In Odessa, he didn’t defend sovereignty, he betrayed it. Kosovo excluded, Vucic applauded. — The GPC Politics.

13. Serbia’s Moscow-friendly president visits Ukraine but refuses to sign ‘anti-Russian’ declaration — AP.

14. Serbian president boasts of not signing Odesa summit declaration, saying he “did not betray” Russia — Ukrainian Pravda.

15. “Kreu i SHISH, Vlora Hyseni shkoi fshehtas në Beograd”, Berisha: Informacionet konfidenciale të vendit anëtar të NATO-s, do shkojnë në dorën e ‘Putinit të vogël’ — BalkanWeb.

16. The Spy Who Wasn’t Vetted

A fired Kosovar spy now leads Albania’s intelligence, sparking fears over loyalty and foreign sway as Edi Rama enters a fourth term, has the shadow state overtaken the real one? — The GPC I Unit.

17. Albania receives naval ship from Italy to boost military and NATO missions — AP.