A Coup by Procedure? Kosovo’s Opposition Risks Democratic Collapse
As Kosovo earns global recognition for reform, internal paralysis driven by opposition obstruction now threatens to unravel its democratic progress through legal manoeuvring and procedural deadlock.
PRISTINA — Seventeen years after its declaration of independence, Kosovo is no longer classified as a fragile or conflict-affected state by the world’s two leading international financial institutions. In the same week, it also reclaimed full membership in the European Quality Assurance Register for Higher Education (EQAR), a signal achievement in its institutional recovery and a striking repudiation of the political dysfunction that once defined it.
The developments mark a profound turning point for a nation long dogged by systemic corruption, political interference, and foreign-fuelled instability. They also serve as a vindication for the reformist government of Prime Minister Albin Kurti, whose administration has sought to extricate Kosovo from the legacy of post-war decay and foreign-manipulated governance.
A Timeline of Institutional Restoration
The chain of events stretches back to 2018, when Kosovo was expelled from EQAR1. The decision followed damning findings that the Kosovo Accreditation Agency (AKA) lacked institutional autonomy due to direct political interference from the PAN-led government. EQAR concluded that the agency could no longer operate independently, a violation of its membership conditions and struck Kosovo from the register.
By 2021, following the controversial toppling of Kurti’s first administration in 20202, a move widely condemned in Europe and attributed to foreign political manipulation. Kurti’s Vetëvendosje-led government returned to power with a mandate for sweeping reform. Almost immediately, the Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Innovation moved to restore autonomy and professional standards within the AKA. Over the next three years, the agency rebuilt its capacity and credibility, aligning itself with European norms.
In 2024, Kosovo formally applied to rejoin EQAR. One year later, in 2025, it was reinstated, this time with full membership rights. “Not only have we returned, but we’ve done so as the first country in the Western Balkans to attain full rights,” Kurti declared in a statement3. “This is a great and important success, proof of our work to bring higher education in line with European standards.”
Kosovo’s EQAR membership now opens the door to increased academic mobility, EU-funded programmes, scholarships, and international cooperation for its universities and students reaffirming its commitment to academic independence and institutional integrity.
The Fall of the Fragile State Narrative
The education milestone came amid even broader geopolitical and financial validation. On 9 July 2025, the World Bank removed Kosovo from its list of fragile and conflict-affected states for the first time since 20084. The designation had long served as a barometer of state weakness and vulnerability to conflict, corruption, and instability, all hallmarks of Kosovo’s early post-independence years.
In a public statement, the World Bank noted Kosovo’s reform trajectory, citing improved fiscal discipline, anti-corruption frameworks, and public sector modernisation. With the appointment of Carole Megevand as the new World Bank country manager, Kosovo’s development portfolio has been restructured around long-term investment and institution-building rather than post-conflict recovery.
Barely a week later, on 17 July, the International Monetary Fund followed suit, excluding Kosovo from its list of fragile and conflict-affected states for the 2026 fiscal year. The Central Bank of Kosovo welcomed the decision, calling it “an important recognition of Kosovo’s institutional progress and macro-financial stability.”
This dual recognition from the World Bank and IMF effectively severs Kosovo from its association with post-war fragility, placing it within a cohort of developing democracies increasingly aligned with European institutional norms.
The Shadow of 2020: Grenell and the Coup That Wasn’t
But the path to these reforms has not been free of turbulence or interference. Much of the Kurti administration’s legitimacy rests on its resilience in the face of destabilisation attempts. The most severe came in early 2020, when Prime Minister Kurti’s first government was abruptly brought down through a no-confidence vote allegedly orchestrated by then-U.S. Special Envoy Richard Grenell.
According to a 2021 report by the European Parliament, Grenell exploited Kurti’s refusal to accept a U.S.-backed Serbia settlement by pressuring coalition partners through a manufactured crisis. Tweets by Donald Trump Jr. and Senator David Perdue, suggesting the U.S. might withdraw troops from Kosovo, were used by Grenell to stoke panic and force a government collapse. European diplomats condemned the manoeuvre, with both French and German embassies issuing formal rebukes.
Grenell, whose diplomatic career has been riddled with controversy, disinformation, and undeclared foreign financial ties, resurfaced in 2025 with similar tactics during Kosovo’s February elections. As revealed by leaked WhatsApp messages, Grenell worked in coordination with local media figure Berat Buzhala to spread false narratives about electoral defeat for Kurti. The campaign echoed the same methods deployed five years prior, misinformation amplified by media proxies, false representation of international consensus, and targeted delegitimisation.
Yet this time, the effort failed.
Kurti publicly rebuffed Grenell’s claims, asserting that Kosovo’s ties with the U.S. remained robust, particularly in the fields of energy and security. His administration survived the disinformation campaign, and its reform agenda advanced with renewed urgency.
From Warlords to Watchdogs
Kosovo’s journey from warlords to watchdogs has been neither swift nor linear. The period from 2008 to 2020 saw a consolidation of power by former war-era elites who transformed liberation credentials into parasitic control of state institutions. The PAN coalition and its affiliates entrenched political clientelism across public administration, undermining both trust and functionality.
By contrast, Kurti’s second term has focused on decoupling public institutions from political patronage, a task many analysts deemed impossible only five years ago. With institutional restoration, regional leadership in higher education standards, and economic stabilisation now under its belt, Kosovo appears to be writing a different story.
The challenges remain considerable. Kosovo continues to face external pressures, not least from Serbia, and from Russian-aligned actors intent on disrupting democratic processes across the Balkans. Domestically, it must also grapple with media vulnerability, judicial inefficiencies, and an enduring brain drain.
Still, for the first time since independence, Kosovo has stepped outside the shadow of fragility. It is now seen less as a cautionary tale and more as an emerging European democracy, not yet finished, but finally on course.
And yet, as the country claws its way out of fragility and corruption with internationally recognised gains, a darker force festers within. The very warlord-aligned faction that once captured Kosovo’s institutions—the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), now appears to be orchestrating a constitutional ambush from the shadows. In a move as desperate as it is dangerous, they have reportedly enlisted the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) once the architects of statehood to file legal complaints at the Supreme Court5, seeking to criminalise the continued service of Prime Minister Albin Kurti and his ministers.
The current standoff over governance in the absence of a parliamentary Speaker, a vacancy sustained by deliberate inaction, has now been framed by some opposition parties as a constitutional breach. Yet it is a legal paradox of their own making. After 41+ failed sessions to elect a Speaker, largely due to systematic opposition abstention or obstruction, the same forces now cite this paralysis as grounds to challenge the legitimacy of the acting government. What began as political gridlock has morphed into something far more calculated: a coordinated effort to unseat a functioning administration not through electoral process or parliamentary debate, but via procedural entrapment and legal escalation. In a post-conflict democracy still consolidating its institutions, such tactics risk eroding not just public trust, but the foundational premise of democratic accountability. Whether viewed as legal manoeuvring or institutional brinkmanship, the effect is the same: a state rendered inert by actors willing to imperil national stability for political gain. At stake is not just the credibility of one government, but the integrity of Kosovo’s democratic framework at the precise moment when the international community has begun to recognise its progress.
Kosovo Education Agency’s Expulsion Angers Opposition MPs — Balkan Insight.
Is Grenell Engineering Another Political Coup?
From diplomacy to disinformation, Grenell resurfaces, fuelling chaos in Kosovo’s elections with the same tactics that toppled Kurti’s government in 2020. — The GPC I Unit.
Kosovan Acting PM Albin Kurti — Facebook Post.