Why Europe should not ignore what is happening in Kosovo

A portal promoting Bedri Hamza and senior PDK figures depicts Kosovan Prime Minister as a legitimate target echoing patterns from a past where political murders went unanswered.

What is unfolding in Kosovo merits the immediate attention of foreign embassies in Pristina and democratic governments across Europe. This is not a question of partisan disagreement or rhetorical excess. It is a security warning. A media outlet operating under the name Dritarja¹ has disseminated content that visually and narratively normalises the assassination² of the sitting Prime Minister Albin Kurti. This is not an isolated lapse in judgment. It forms a coherent pattern of psychological conditioning that aligns with political messaging promoted by the Democratic Party of Kosovo PDK and figures publicly associated with it.

The central image circulated by Dritarja depicts the Prime Minister as a target in an execution style illustration accompanied by text portraying him as morally illegitimate and unworthy. In security terms this is a textbook case of dehumanisation. Modern political violence is rarely spontaneous. It is preceded by narrative preparation in which the victim is stripped of legitimacy and violence is framed as thinkable. When such imagery is circulated by a portal that simultaneously amplifies PDK politicians and campaign material it must be treated as a hostile information operation not as commentary.

Dritarja portal normalising assassination imagery and promoting PDK leaders.

The accompanying content promoted by the same outlet reinforces this assessment. Posts amplifying Abelard Tahiri³ and Memli Krasniqi⁴ present glorified militant symbolism while advancing a political narrative of moral exclusivity. Other posts openly campaign for PDK and its candidate for Prime Minister Bedri Hamza⁵ while framing opposition leadership as traitorous or illegitimate. This is not neutral aggregation. It is coordinated amplification. For an international audience it is important to be precise. No claim is made here of direct orders. The concern is about consent tolerance and political benefit. Under international standards of responsibility political actors bear accountability when they knowingly benefit from or fail to condemn messaging that incites or normalises violence.

Kosovo is not a blank slate. It is a post conflict society with an unresolved history of political killings. Under PDK led governments over two decades politicians activists and journalists were assassinated or died under unresolved circumstances. These cases remain open wounds. The fact that former President and PDK leader Hashim Thaçi is currently on trial in The Hague for alleged crimes including persecution and murder underscores why any rhetoric that edges toward legitimising violence must be treated with extreme seriousness. This context transforms what might elsewhere be dismissed as provocative imagery into a credible security concern.

Bedri Hamza as the de facto leader and candidate of PDK carries particular responsibility. His campaign has been actively promoted by Dritarja through explicit electoral messaging. Silence in such circumstances is not neutral. Under democratic norms it is incumbent on political leaders to immediately and unequivocally repudiate any content that depicts or implies violence against political opponents. Failure to do so raises legitimate questions about political culture and intent without requiring speculative accusations.

Equally troubling is the failure of the Association of Journalists of Kosovo to respond. Professional self regulation exists precisely to draw red lines when journalism is weaponised. The absence of any public condemnation or inquiry signals institutional paralysis or political capture. For international partners who have invested heavily in media freedom in Kosovo this silence should be alarming. A press environment that tolerates imagery of political assassination without protest is not free. It is compromised.

International law is clear on this matter. Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights obliges states to prohibit advocacy of hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination hostility or violence. The European Convention on Human Rights allows restrictions on expression where necessary for the protection of public safety and the prevention of disorder or crime. The OSCE commitments on media freedom explicitly warn against the use of media to incite violence in fragile post conflict societies. None of these frameworks require that violence occur. The threshold is the creation of a climate where violence is legitimised or normalised.

For embassies and European governments this should not be viewed through a narrow domestic political lens. The assassination or attempted assassination of a sitting Prime Minister in Kosovo would have immediate regional consequences. It would destabilise internal security undermine democratic transfer of power and send a signal across the Western Balkans that political violence remains an acceptable tool. Preventive attention is therefore not interference. It is responsibility.

This analysis does not assert guilt. It identifies risk. It names actors whose messaging is being amplified and institutions that have failed to act. It calls for vigilance not verdicts. The lesson from Europe’s own history is that political violence is rarely sudden. It is rehearsed in words images and silences. Kosovo has seen this before. That is precisely why it must not be ignored now.

---

1. Dritarja’s Facebook Account.

2. Dritarja’s Facebook Post targeting Albin Kurti, Dec 15, 2025.

3. Dritarja’s Facebook Post, promoting Abelard Tahiri.

4. Dritarja’s Facebook Post, promoting Memli Krasniqi.

5. Dritarja’s Facebook Post, promoting Bedri Hamza.