Stability Theatre: Von der Leyen’s Gift to Vucic and Moscow
Von der Leyen’s platitudes reward Belgrade, scold Prishtina, and whatever the intent, serve Moscow’s script: blur culpability, bankroll dependency, and turn EU »stability« into strategic corrosion.
Ursula von der Leyen landed in Belgrade1 and Prishtina2 with the language of bromide diplomacy »peace, prosperity, solidarity«, »reliable partner«, »de-escalation«. It reads like a leaflet for a bank that’s already gone bust. In the Western Balkans, where euphemism is a currency of its own, this isn’t merely tone-deaf. It’s dangerous. Her message flatters a Serbian leadership that has spent two years tightening its embrace of Moscow, militarising at speed, and exporting instability into Kosovo, while telling the one government in the region that actually aligns with Europe’s values to take a breath and lower its voice. It is the moral geometry of appeasement, centre the aggressor, chide the target, call it balance.
Start with the record, not the rhetoric. Two years after the Banjska attack, when a well-armed Serb paramilitary unit killed Kosovo Police Sergeant Afrim Bunjaku and fought an all-day battle around a monastery, accountability remains lopsided. Kosovo’s Special Prosecutor has indicted forty-five people, including Milan Radoicic. Belgrade hasn’t extradited him. KFOR stays reinforced, British troops rotate to prevent the next »aberration«, which was never an aberration at all3. Meanwhile, Serbia has shopped for power the way hedge funds shop for distressed debt4, French Rafales (twelve of them)5, Chinese FK-3 air-defence batteries6, Russian-origin Mi-35 gunships7, Pantsirs for point defence8, loitering munitions for deniable harassment. And then there’s the artery that matters most, gas. Belgrade is locking in another multi-year deal with Gazprom, cementing dependency that outlasts press conferences and photo-ops.
Security alignment has followed the hardware. Senior Serbian officials have publicly thanked Russian services for »assistance« in domestic security matters, the so-called humanitarian centre in Nis9 remains a standing invitation to suspicion. At the UN, when Serbia briefly voted with Ukraine, the president called it »a mistake« by nightfall. None of this is subtle. It’s choreography, one step towards Moscow, one half-step towards Brussels, hand outstretched to Paris for jets while the other hand signs gas contracts in Cyrillic.
Against that ledger, von der Leyen’s Belgrade greeting »the EU will continue to help keep Serbia safe during the winter… a reliable partner« lands like a subsidy for the strategy that has been undermining the EU’s own neighbourhood. »Reliable«, yes, for whom? For Gazprom, which keeps a member-candidate energy-captive. For the Kremlin, whose preferred narrative is that Europe rewards the spoiler and disciplines the ally. And for Aleksandar Vucic, who converts Brussels’ indulgence into proof that autocracy pays.
If you wanted to design a communications plan that advances Moscow’s objectives in the Balkans, you would start here, recast aggression as a mutual misunderstanding, demand »de-escalation« from the party under attack, reassure the aggressor with public warmth, and keep the cheques flowing. To be clear, there is no evidence von der Leyen is anyone’s agent, such claims demand proof and none has been presented. But the effect of her message is indistinguishable from Moscow’s playbook, blur culpability, buy time, shift costs onto the victim, and anaesthetise the audience with the vocabulary of process. The suspicion that she is, at best, doing the Kremlin’s work for free is not slander, it’s an inference from outcomes.
The reaction on her own X post is a grim focus group.
»You are not welcome here! Serbia will never be part of your hypocritical EU… Glory to Russia!« wrote one account over a photo of an EU flag being torched. Another one: »EU membership is war and economic downfall«, overlaying a swastika where stars should be. A third, pointing to smashed faces and bloodied protesters: »peace, prosperity, solidarity you say? we currently need blood transfusions, crutches and wheelchairs…« And from a pro-democracy voice, the reply says »you are partner with a dictator, friend of putin and xi… you are the most hated eu politician in serbia. you are the reason why support for eu in serbia keeps falling..«
The Kremlin-adjacent hard right mocks the EU as Nazi, the Serbian street bleeds, the democratic opposition despairs. When your message simultaneously delights the pro-Russia crowd and demoralises the pro-Europe one, you are not projecting values, you are laundering someone else’s.
The Kosovo leg was worse. »Touchdown in Kosovo… de-escalates tensions in the country«, she wrote, as if the problem were Prishtina’s body language rather than Belgrade’s habits, arms in church basements ahead of Banjska, road barricades marketed as »community concerns«, sabotage of critical infrastructure, and a standing refusal to extradite. Asking Kosovo to »de-escalate« while Kremlin-aligned networks probe its sovereignty is the diplomatic equivalent of advising a burgled family to stop provoking the man jiggling their back door. It isn’t policy, it’s pastoral care for the wrong parishioner.
There is a British line for this, delivered with a straight face and a razor in it:
splendid—let’s fetch Kosovo a cup of tea while Vucic’s operators finish drilling through the wall. Then we’ll gently remind the occupants to »mind the noise«.
Brussels calls it balance. Moscow calls it Tuesday.
This posture has consequences beyond Balkan cartography. It deepens the very anti-EU sentiment von der Leyen claims to fear. Serbia’s students10, months of marches, truncheons, and the hum of loyalist gangs on the edge of the frame, have not been met with meaningful European solidarity. They see the European Commission’s chief clasp hands with the man who presides over their intimidation and call him a »reliable partner«. They hear sermons about »de-escalation« addressed to the target, not the perpetrator. Then we wonder why the movement that ought to be the EU’s natural ally looks towards Brussels and shrugs. Power notices where power stands.
And while Brussels dispenses calmatives, Prishtina is doing the unfashionable work of law. In the space of three days this month the capital experienced an intelligence whiplash11 that, in any mature democracy, would be recognised as institutional adulthood, not »tension«. On 7 October, prosecutors closed a probe into alleged misuse of a Kosovo Intelligence Agency12 »special fund« roughly two million euros spent between 2017 and 2020, citing limitation periods for two former directors and insufficient evidence for a third, even as KIA’s internal inspector insisted the abuse looked »clear and grounded13«. Two days later, police, working with KIA and the Special Prosecution, arrested the commentator Fatmir Sheholli on suspicion of espionage. On 10 October, the Basic Court of Prishtina ordered one month’s detention under Article 124 of the Criminal Code, which covers entering the service of a foreign intelligence service or transmitting protected information. One file closed for lack of chargeable proof, a separate, months-long espionage case moved decisively into the courts. That is not escalation. That is a state moving through the gears, inspection, prosecutorial triage, search, seizure, judicial supervision.
The overlap between stories is not invented by conspiracy theorists, it is in the public record. KIA’s inspector has said that among the »special fund’s« recipients was the same commentator now under arrest, Sheholli himself has acknowledged working with KIA in the past, while declining to discuss sums or tasks. Prosecutors did not press charges on the fund file, they did petition for detention in the espionage case, citing gravity, risk of flight, interference and repetition. Guilt is not established. But the signal is unmistakable, Kosovo’s institutions are confronting infiltration with warrants and chain-of-custody, not with performative hand-wringing.
The politics did not pause for the court docket. The day after Sheholli’s arrest, Kosovo’s parliament finally constituted itself by electing14 Nenad Rasic, a Serb MP independent of Belgrade’s preferred list as deputy speaker, breaking a months-long blockade15. In the information space, the arrest collided with an attempt to launder unauthenticated »intercepts« into public discourse16, a media personality who sat with Sheholli at the moment of detention promptly framed the operation as a »scenario« and waved a story about a USB stick on television. This is the texture of modern subversion, parallel structures creating procedural knots while influence merchants flood the zone with unverifiable »exclusives«. Prishtina’s answer ballots in the chamber, warrants on the street was the opposite of »escalation«. It was governance.
Set this against von der Leyen’s sermon and the satire writes itself. »De-escalate«, she tells the one government that is actually shutting down clandestine finance, arresting suspected agents, and unlocking its legislature without violence. One can almost hear the Kremlin’s chuckle, do keep it down while we finish our work.
Across the border, the theatre intensifies. Albania’s prime minister, Edi Rama, has fashioned himself impresario-in-chief for »DREJTËSI PËR ÇLIRIMTARËT17«, drawing crowds to rally for men now on trial at the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, an institution Kosovo’s own parliament created, however reluctantly, because witness protection at home could not be guaranteed. In recent months the same social networks that pumped out the rallies also amplified Sheholli’s calls to muster in Tirana and The Hague, stamped with UÇK/KLA18 iconography. When the head of a neighbouring government’s communications drops neatly into the echo-chamber of a figure arrested on suspicion of espionage, it doesn’t prove coordination. It proves proximity, political, informational and strategic, to a campaign whose net effect is to delegitimise the only court capable of arbitrating Kosovo’s darkest chapters.
Rama’s defenders say he is merely defending dignity. The record suggests method, status-neutral »Open Balkan« schemes that entrench Serbian leverage without recognition, back-channel drafts for an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities with executive teeth, a public crusade against The Hague that blurs the difference between admissibility and credibility. Fold in Albania’s curious appointments at the apex of its intelligence service and you begin to see a pattern, European in vocabulary, Belgrade-friendly in outcome. It is precisely this murky architecture of old networks, new platforms that Prishtina has started to prise open. And it is precisely here that von der Leyen’s »de-escalate« acts as accelerant for the wrong fire.
The larger strategic folly is this: Europe is treating Serbia as the indispensable bridge while Serbia behaves like a forward operating base. The Kremlin has two Balkans projects. Ukraine is the battlefield of conquest, Kosovo is the laboratory of infiltration. Energy binds Serbia to Moscow, weapons modernise its leverage, and information ops run through Serbian media into Kosovo’s public square. Every time Brussels hugs Vucic a little tighter and chides Prishtina for not being more »constructive«, it signals to the region that values are negotiable and accountability is optional, if you are big enough, cynical enough, and useful enough. That isn’t »stability«. It’s a tutorial in corrosion.
The Commission’s defenders will say the EU is divided five member states still don’t recognise Kosovo and that the job, therefore, is to keep the table from collapsing. But furniture isn’t policy. Conditionality exists for a reason. When a candidate state refuses extradition in a terrorism-linked case, deepens energy dependence on an adversary, thanks that adversary’s security services for help at home, buys layered air defence from Beijing, and treats its own civil society as a nuisance to be kettled, the response is not a winter-warmth stipend. It is leverage, targeted measures against the networks responsible for Banjska and subsequent sabotage, hard conditioning of financial flows on cooperation with Kosovo prosecutions and explicit linkage of any industrial bonanzas—lithium dreams, shiny jets to rule-of-law performance that can be measured, not merely declared.
Above all, it is language that tells the truth about agency. »De-escalation« is not a virtue when it is demanded of the party being destabilised. It is an alibi. Kosovo aligned with Europe when it was unpopular to do so. It de-risked the EU’s frontier while the EU indulged the man lighting matches at its edge. That asymmetry should embarrass a Commission president who likes to frame herself as custodian of the Union’s creed.
If there is a charitable reading of von der Leyen’s tour, it is that she mistook geniality for strategy. The less charitable and more persuasive reading is that Brussels has once again chosen a photo of »stability« over the work of it. The last time Europe rehearsed this morality play, it took a war in Ukraine to pierce the illusion. We do not have to wait for the Balkan sequel.
A final note on ethics. Allegations that a European leader is »hired« by Russian operations are serious, they require proof, not insinuation, and none has been offered. Journalism must separate fact from conjecture. The facts here are sufficient, her words nourish the aggressor’s narrative, undercut the ally’s security, and teach every would-be spoiler that the Union’s values are a talking point, not a threshold.
Von der Leyen’s job is not to soothe the strongman and scold the besieged. It is to defend Europe’s line where it is actually being tested, in a democracy that took Europe at its word, in the streets of Belgrade where students face batons, and in Prishtina’s courts where espionage is confronted with statute rather than slogans. Anything less is not partnership. It is policy by lullaby sweet, soporific, and exactly what the Kremlin ordered.
Kosovo, Not Serbia, Is Britain’s Front Line Against Moscow
Two years on from the Banjska attack, the lesson for Europe is not simply about a firefight in a northern Kosovo village. It is about geography, choices, and clarity. Ukraine is the frontline of Russia’s brutal expansion eastward; Kosovo is the frontline of its infiltration westward. To ignore that is to repeat the blindness that allowed Crimea to be annexed in 2014 and to invite the same consequences in the Balkans tomorrow.
Appeasement and Aftermath: What Banjska Revealed About the West
In a charged London chamber, voices clashed over Kosovo, Serbia, and Western appeasement, exposing Europe’s uneasy conscience and the perilous politics of power, principle, and paralysis. — The GPC Europe Watch.
Serbia After Banjska: Guns, Gas, and Russian Leverage
Two years after Banjska, Serbia is more militarised, energy-bound to Russia, and reliant on Moscow’s security, while Western responses remain declaratory, fragmented, and strategically hesitant. — The GPC Politics.
France Arms Serbia, Ignoring Genocidal Past and Russian Ties
Macron arms Serbia’s autocrat, ignoring its Russian ties and genocidal past, undermining European security and principles in a desperate bid for influence. — The GPC Balkan Watch.
Serbia shows off Chinese missiles in military parade amid high European tensions
‘Power of unity’ event with 10,000 personnel marks first joint appearance of the FK-3 and HQ-17AE air defence missile systems in the country — SCMP.
US Sees Russia’s ‘Humanitarian Center’ in Serbia as Spy Outpost — VOA.
Russian Centre in Serbia Scorns Espionage Claims
The do-director of the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Centre in Nis, Vjaceslav Vlasenko, has denied accusations that it operates a military or espionage base for Russia in the Balkans. — Balkan Insight.
Lithium, Lies, and the Balkan Strongman Europe Loves
Europe props up Vucic’s autocracy, trading democratic principles for lithium, arms deals, and false “stability,” while Serbia dances to Putin’s tune and strangles its own future. — The GPC Europe Watch.
Pristina’s Week of Intelligence Whiplash
Kosovo closes AKI (AKI) fund probe citing limitations, then arrests commentator Fatmir Sheholli for suspected espionage; court orders one month’s detention under Article 124 following investigation. — The GPC Balkan Watch.
Dyshimet për fondin special të AKI-së, 2 milionë euro pa evidencë - hetimi mbyllet me parashkrim — Kallxo.com
The Republic of No Paper Trail
Kosovo’s postwar republic became a franchise, secrecy for currency, calendars as alibis, prosecutors as shields. Names with motorcades prospered, the law performed never enforced. — The GPC Politics.
Espionage Arrest Shadows Kosovo’s Parliamentary Breakthrough
Kosovo’s parliament constituted after electing Serb MP Nenad Rasic deputy speaker, ending months-long deadlock. An espionage arrest spotlights Belgrade’s influence operations. — The GPC Balkan Watch.
Kosovo’s Deadlock Broken, But Democracy Still at Risk
Kosovo’s parliament broke months of deadlock electing Dimal Basha as speaker, but opposition sabotage aligned with Belgrade threatens sovereignty, justice, & the republic’s fragile democratic future. — The GPC Balkan Watch.
Zeka, Sheholli and the USB BIA’s Playbook
Evidence shows Milaim Zeka’s portal weaponised BIA-fed recordings via Fatmir Sheholli to smear Nenad Rasic and destabilise Kosovo’s Assembly Elections. — The GPC Politics.
“FREEDOM HAS A NAME… thousands of hearts will unite this Friday… to demand with one voice JUSTICE FOR THE LIBERATORS.” Edi Rama.
UCK (UÇK)
Full name: Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës, meaning Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).
Background:
Formed in the early 1990s by ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.
The UÇK’s stated goal was to liberate Kosovo from Serbian (Yugoslav) rule and achieve independence for Kosovo.
It engaged in armed resistance against Serbian police, military, and paramilitary forces, especially during the Kosovo War (1998–1999).
Serbia and Yugoslavia at the time labeled the UÇK as a terrorist organisation, while many Kosovars and international supporters saw it as a liberation movement.
The war ended after NATO’s 1999 intervention, and Kosovo eventually came under UN administration, leading to its declaration of independence in 2008.