Kosovo’s October Vote: Inclusion or Impunity?
Kosovo’s 12 October elections test democracy itself: end Belgrade’s proxy grip, safeguard Serb pluralism, enforce law fairly, and prevent ‘inclusion’ mutating into impunity that crushes integration.
Kosovo heads toward municipal elections on 12 October with far more at stake than control of local services. The vote will help decide whether the country finally breaks a decade-long cycle in which Belgrade’s proxy, ‘Srpska Lista’ (Serbian List), dominates Serb-majority municipalities and distorts democratic life, or whether space opens for pluralism and genuine integration of Kosovo Serbs into the state. President Vjosa Osmani has formally set the date1; the context is a fragile post-parliamentary stalemate and a public weary of pressure, boycotts and episodic violence.
This story has a chronology and a ledger. In 2021, EU election observers praised the technical conduct of the local polls but recorded2 a political reality that has barely shifted: Srpska Lista “dominates the municipal assemblies in the Kosovo-Serb majority municipalities, in some of them being the only political force.” That dominance is not neutral; it narrows the field to one party tightly steered from Belgrade and squeezes independent Serb voices out of public life.
The next chapters made the stakes unmistakable. On 24 September 2023, a Kosovo police officer, Afrim Bunjaku, was killed during an armed incursion in Banjska. Milan Radoicic, a central power-broker around Srpska Lista, later admitted involvement. Kosovo prosecutors have since indicted dozens on terrorism charges3; Serbia has refused meaningful accountability. That is not ordinary party politics; it is the spillover of state-linked coercion into Kosovo’s municipalities.
By late 2024 and into 2025, Kosovo’s institutions began to test whether legal guardrails could curb this behaviour. The Central Election Commission moved to bar Srpska Lista from the February parliamentary ballot; the appeals panel overturned the decision4 within days and the party ran, as it has before. EU and Council of Europe observers again called the elections peaceful, but still flagged Belgrade’s interference and the pressure ecosystem surrounding Serb voters. The lesson for Prishtina’s regulators was brutal: when institutions apply the law to a party that fuses politics, patronage and state direction, international guardians5 of “process” default to inclusion even when inclusion entrenches coercion.
As the 12 October local elections approach, we are watching the same movie with sharper focus. In August this year the CEC again refused to certify Srpska Lista for the local polls6; Western embassies reacted with public alarm7; and, true to form, the appeals body later cleared the party to run. That institutional whiplash is not cost-free; it signals to local strongmen that rules are malleable and that outside actors will shield them in the name of “pluralism,” even as that shielding strangles pluralism among Kosovo Serbs themselves.
Meanwhile, evidence keeps piling up about how monopoly power is enforced on the ground. This week KOHA Ditore reported8 that two non–Srpska Lista Serb candidates in Ranillug, one from the Serbian National Movement and one from the Freedom, Justice and Survival list, were dismissed from jobs in a “parallel” municipality and staged a three-day hunger strike, accusing Srpska Lista and a Novo Brdo mayor of political retaliation. The U.S. Embassy told KoSSev9 it is “concerned by any efforts to restrict competition,” a carefully worded acknowledgement that the playing field is not simply uneven; it is patrolled.
Accountability is owed across the board. Belgrade bears primary responsibility for constructing and sustaining a party-state pipeline into Kosovo’s north, pairing social-benefit dependency with hard-edge intimidation. Srpska Lista’s leadership bears responsibility for running that machinery and, in the case of Banjska10, for crossing the line into organised violence. But Kosovo’s political class shares blame for years of expediency, coalitions that traded ministries for calm, and a tolerance of “parallel” structures that hollowed out the state’s authority. International actors, the EU, U.S., UK and OSCE, must answer for a doctrine of “inclusion at any cost” that has too often morphed into impunity. In 2021 they documented the monopoly; after 2023 they saw its effects in blood11; in 2024–25 they pressed Prishtina12 to keep the door open anyway, while simultaneously arming Belgrade with prestige hardware and political indulgence. That is not principled consistency; it is strategic incoherence13.
The deepest harm is not abstract “undermining of Kosovo.” It is the daily suffocation of Kosovo Serbs’ right to a normal civic life inside Kosovo. When one Belgrade-steered list monopolises representation, dissenting Serb teachers, nurses and clerks are told their jobs depend on obedience; rival Serb parties are starved of access; and municipal assemblies become rubber-stamps rather than arenas of service delivery. EU observers noted14 this year that Srpska Lista even refused to appear in RTK2 debates, shrinking the media space for alternative Serb parties and leaving them to campaign largely on social media. This is not how a minority integrates; it is how a minority is kept captive.
So what now, fairly, squarely, and without euphemism? Prishtina should keep the gate open for Serb participation while enforcing the law against coercion, financing networks and “parallel” bodies. That means protecting Serb candidates who break with Srpska Lista, prosecuting intimidation cases with evidence and due process, and resourcing municipal services so loyal citizens see dividends for showing up. Belgrade should face real conditionality on extradition cooperation over Banjska, on dismantling cross-border patronage structures, and on ceasing political direction of a party ostensibly operating in a neighbour’s elections. And Western partners must stop laundering a monopoly as “representation.” If you insist on Srpska Lista’s participation, you are responsible for defending the conditions that make participation genuinely competitive starting with the safety and employment of Serb opponents of Srpska Lista in the north. Otherwise, “inclusion” is just another word for control15.
On 12 October, Kosovo’s voters will not settle the north’s problems in a day. But they can set a direction. A ballot that finally allows independent Serb voices to breathe and holds every actor, foreign and domestic, to the same standard of law would do more for Kosovo’s sovereignty and for Kosovo Serbs’ dignity than a decade of managed pretence. The choice is stark: democracy as living practice, or democracy as a stage on which the same actors play the same parts while everyone else pays the price.
The Balkan Soap Opera: Serbia Plays, Kosovo Pays
Kosovo burns while Serbia struts, torching infrastructure with impunity as the West offers nothing but limp condemnations and performative ‘monitoring.’ French Fighter jets, EU and US Money for Vucic, lectures for Kosovo, and a bridge that stands as a monument to diplomatic cowardice. Hypocrisy reigns supreme, with the EU, US, Germany and France enabling Serbia’s tantrums while scolding Kosovo for daring to exist. Sovereignty, it seems, is negotiable, if you’re not the West’s Balkan darling.
President Osmani has set October 12th 2025, as the date of holding of regular local elections — President’s Office.
European Union Election Observation Mission KOSOVO 2021 Final Report Municipal Elections 17 October – 14 November 2021 — EU Report.
Kosovo to start trial for Banjska attack by Serb group: Why it matters — AL Jazeera.
Kosovo appeals body overturns ban on ethnic Serb party, allowing it to run in parliamentary election — AP.
Serbia’s Aggression Thrives on Western Complicity
Western appeasement of Serbia’s Kremlin-aligned autocracy undermines Balkan stability, emboldens aggression, and betrays democratic values. The time for complacency and complicity is over. — The GPC Balkan Watch.
Belgrade-Backed Kosovo Serb Party Barred from Running in October’s Local Polls
Kosovo’s Central Election Commission rejected the Srpska Lista party’s application to compete in the October 12 local elections, sparking expressions of concern from Western diplomats. — Balkan Insight.
US, EU and the UK Legitimising Terror in Kosovo
By endorsing Serbian List, the West tramples Kosovo’s constitution, empowers Belgrade’s proxies, and transforms “democracy” into a weapon against Europe’s youngest state. — The GPC Balkan Watch.
Partitë serbe ankohen për shantazh nga Lista Serbe, një rast denoncohet edhe në Polici — KOHA Ditore/English.
Stagecraft, Sanctions, and Serbia’s Shadow
An explosive interview unpacks Kosovo’s drone disputes, KFOR denials, Grenell’s stagecraft, EU pressure, and Albania’s intelligence choices demanding accountability. — The GPC Balkan Watch.
One Year After Banjska: The West’s Role in Serbia’s Balkan Escalation
One year after the Banjska attacks, Serbia’s aggression and Western appeasement continue to destabilise Kosovo, raising questions about regional security and international accountability. — The GPC Balkan Watch.
Kosovo’s Institutions Play Putin’s Balkan Game
By certifying Arsenijevic’s party, Kosovo’s institutions are not protecting democracy; they are legitimising Belgrade’s Trojan horse and empowering a Kremlin-styled provocateur with credibility. — The GPC Politics.
Democracy or Surrender: The Case Against Serbian List
Moral Eunuchs in the West, Terror in the Balkans — The GPC Politics.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Peaceful and vibrant election process despite harsh rhetoric reflecting deep divisions Pristina, Kosovo, 11 February 2025 — EU Report.
A Spy Case, A Warning
A Croatian pilot’s alleged leaks to Serbia’s List expose a network. While Washington and Brussels appease Belgrade, Kosovo faces orchestrated hybrid attacks. Accountability, not ‘de-escalation.’ — The GPC Balkan Watch.