A Spy Case, A Warning
A Croatian pilot’s alleged leaks to Serbia’s List expose a network. While Washington and Brussels appease Belgrade, Kosovo faces orchestrated hybrid attacks. Accountability, not ‘de-escalation.’
I’ve covered this region long enough to know that when the story breaks in the margins, an island off Dalmatia, an anonymous court in Split, you should pay close attention. This week, Croatian outlets reported that a helicopter pilot with the Croatian Air Force, who had served with KFOR in Kosovo, and his long-time partner from north Mitrovica were arrested on the island of Vis on suspicion of espionage. According to Index.hr1, investigators believe the pilot passed confidential information to his partner, who then relayed it to the Serbian List, the Belgrade-aligned party that has dominated Kosovo’s Serb politics for a decade. Europol is said to be assisting; both suspects have been questioned; pre-trial detention has been ordered; the case now straddles Croatia’s civilian and military jurisdictions2.
Vecernji list went further, reporting that the woman identified by initials, a sociologist known in Mitrovica’s media circles had worked around international missions, including EULEX and UNMIK, and cultivated ties with judges and prosecutors. RTL’s evening news added3 that the pilot had cleared Croatia’s security vetting to serve in KFOR, an uncomfortable data point for Zagreb and for NATO vetting standards alike.
KFOR, for its part, said4 it “takes these allegations seriously.”
If the charges hold, the details matter: investigators reportedly found phone communications in which movements of KFOR units and situational reporting from flashpoints like Zubin Potok were discussed, along with information tied to the detention and transfers surrounding Dejan Pantic, a former Kosovo policeman whose 2022 arrest helped trigger the barricade crisis in the north. Even with the suspects denying wrongdoing, the pattern that Croatian reporters describe is depressingly familiar to those of us who watch how Belgrade projects power in Kosovo: gather granular operational data; funnel it through political cut-outs that wear the suit of “party” but function like extensions of a security service5.
The party that isn’t just a party
Western analysts have documented for years that Srpska Lista (the Serbian List6) operates with tight direction from Belgrade’s ruling bloc and serves as the principal lever of Serbian state influence inside Kosovo. That’s not a conspiracy theory; it’s political science and European Parliamentese7. Scholars and EU documents alike describe the party’s dominance, its umbilical link to Belgrade, and crucially since 2023, its proximity to Milan Radoicic, the sanctioned power-broker who publicly admitted organising the September 24, 2023 armed incursion at Banjska8.
Banjska was the moment the mask slipped. A Kosovo police sergeant, Afrim Bunjaku, was killed. Attackers fell back into Serbia amid an arsenal of heavy weapons that Kosovo authorities displayed to foreign media the next day. The EU, the U.S., and the European Parliament termed it a terrorist attack; Radoicic was detained briefly in Belgrade and released, and he remains at large in Serbia. Reuters9, AP10, and others have covered the indictments of dozens of suspects in Prishtina and Kosovo’s unheeded calls for extradition. The pattern armed men in unmarked kit, sanctuaries across the boundary line, deniability in Belgrade is not innovative; it is Crimea-era tradecraft adopted for the Balkans.
This week’s Croatian spy case, if substantiated in court, fits that post-Banjska continuum: a political funnel (Serb List), an intelligence end-user (Belgrade), and the harvesting of movement-level data about NATO and local security forces. Gazeta Express11 summed up what KFOR officials quietly told colleagues: the integrity of classified information is paramount and this kind of breach, even at the periphery, corrodes deterrence.
The West’s strategic incoherence
Against this backdrop, Washington and key EU capitals have drifted into a policy of appeasing Belgrade on the theory that inducements can unmoor Serbia from Moscow. In September 2022, Serbia’s foreign minister signed a document in New York to “consult” and align on foreign policy with the Russian Federation, on the very sidelines of UN General Assembly debates about Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine12. Belgrade still refuses to join EU sanctions on Moscow. These are not ambiguous facts; they are on the record13.
Yet in 2024 France pushed through a €2.7 billion Rafale sale to Serbia14, pitched in Paris as European statecraft15; supportive analysis suggested it might help pry Belgrade away from the Kremlin16. That’s magical thinking with wings. The deal deepens Serbia’s access to Western aerospace know-how even as the country hosts a “Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center” in Nis17 that U.S. officials18 and analysts have long warned could function as a Russian intelligence lily pad19. No Western policymaker would accept this mix in their own neighbourhood; somehow the Balkans are where principles go on sabbatical.
And while Paris loaded the toolbox with carrots, pro-Kremlin influence networks kept burrowing: Wagner-branded recruitment and “cultural” initiatives sprouted in Belgrade in late 202220, even as the Kremlin’s war machine harvested Balkan volunteers21. When you reward a state that keeps its feet in two camps, you don’t move it toward yours; you teach it that there’s no price for duplicity.
What happened in the north and who looked away
The north’s slow-motion crisis since late 2022 has been narrated to Western audiences as an algebra of “both sides.” The facts are uglier. After Belgrade orchestrated a boycott of local institutions, then of elections, mayors elected in threadbare turnouts tried to assume office. Violence followed. KFOR confirmed that 30 peacekeepers were injured in Zvecan on May 29, 2023, three by gunfire22. Weeks later, Serbian authorities seized three Kosovo policemen near the border; Prishtina called it abduction on Kosovo territory23. For ordinary Kosovars, these were not “complications”; they were proof of a one-way ratchet toward coercion.
In September 2023, the ratchet clicked at Banjska. Kosovo displayed captured weaponry, armoured vehicles, and crates of munitions24; the prime minister laid out evidence of training on Serbian bases; European outlets published details; Radoicic went on Serbian TV to shoulder responsibility only to walk free. That impunity, not Prishtina’s posture25, is what destabilises deterrence. It’s telling that in Westminster, MPs like Alicia Kearns put it more plainly than many on the continent: the violence flowed from a Belgrade-engineered boycott and armed militias, and the “de-escalation” refrain too often landed only on the victim26.
Washington has been worse than inconsistent; it has been conceptually unserious. The U.S. ambassador in Prishtina has leaned into public scolding of a democratic ally while sparing the authors of armed incursions the kind of naming-and-shaming that changes behaviour. Secretary Blinken’s team speaks the language of “both parties must take steps,” then looks the other way when one party signs a foreign-policy alignment document with Sergey Lavrov27, releases a self-acknowledged militia leader after a day in custody, and treats extradition requests as a joke. That isn’t diplomacy; it’s maintenance of the illusion of process.
In Brussels, Josep Borrell and Miroslav Lajcak28 keep acting as if the frame is 2013, process-heavy, cost-free for Belgrade, with Prishtina expected to trade tangible authority for promissory notes. Emmanuel Macron’s Rafale diplomacy took this logic airborne. None of them have convincingly explained how rewarding a government that won’t sanction Russia, won’t extradite indicted gunmen, and won’t relinquish constitutional claims on Kosovo produces stability. It produces only leverage for Belgrade and leverage is the coin of the realm in a gray-zone war.
The ledger of Serbian state violence is not a blank page
This is not a question of historical resentment. The U.S. government’s own archive records how29, in 1999, Serbian and Yugoslav forces systematically expelled over a million Kosovar Albanians, burned hundreds of towns and villages, and left bodies in mass graves, sometimes later exhumed or burned to conceal evidence. Human Rights Watch documented rape as an instrument of that ethnic cleansing campaign30. These were not aberrations; they were policy. When today’s Serbian leadership refuses accountability for Banjska and cultivates hard-edged influence structures in the north, it is tapping into a lineage, not an accident.
Hard questions for Prishtina, too without false equivalence
There is a line of argument in Prishtina, one I’ve heard from security officials and civil society alike that the Serb List should be treated as a hostile instrument, barred from ballots, and dismantled as a counterintelligence threat. The impulse is understandable when a party’s vice-president admits to leading an armed attack and Western sanctions tie its orbit to organised crime. But proscription carries real risks in a democracy, especially one with reserved minority representation. A cleaner route is law-driven: target individuals, finance, and the illicit security structures (“Civilna Zaštita,” “Severna Brigada”) that Kosovo authorities and European outlets have linked to violence; enforce the criminal law uniformly; and keep doors open for Serb political participation that is independent of Belgrade’s services. That is slower and less satisfying, but it is how rule-of-law states win.
On claims of deeper infiltration
Some have alleged that, in earlier governments, Belgrade-linked operatives penetrated Kosovo’s institutions far beyond coalition politics into security bodies and sensitive committees. What I can say, based on public record, is this: after the EU-facilitated Brussels process began in 2011 and especially from 2013 onward, Serb integration into central structures accelerated; coalition governments involving the Serb List held ministerial portfolios and influence over committees; and the Kosovo Security Force’s evolution explicitly sought multiethnic participation31. Beyond those uncontested facts32, sweeping claims about specific “BIA” operatives occupying deputy posts require evidence that is not publicly available. As an investigative standard, we should not present what we cannot source.
But the structural critique stands: the EU normalised Belgrade’s ability to extend political control through the Serb List, then feigned surprise when that mechanism doubled as a conveyor belt for pressure and, in extremis, violence. The arrest in Croatia again, if the evidence holds, would simply be the latest junction on that belt.
What the West should do: yesterday
Stop pretending that “de-escalation” is a neutral mantra. Name Banjska for what it was and condition any high-end transfer (yes, including Rafales) on cooperation with investigations, extraditions where legally feasible, and verifiable steps to dismantle paramilitary structures. Treat the Nis “humanitarian” hub for what Western officials have warned it can be: an intelligence springboard. Support Kosovo in targeting criminal networks in the north while insisting on due process and minority protections. And above all, end the habit of threatening Prishtina’s democratically elected institutions with isolation while indulging Belgrade’s calibrated brinkmanship.
If Washington and Brussels keep rewarding Serbia’s balancing act, they will forfeit moral authority in a place where, for a generation, their word mattered. They will also invite a vacuum others are eager to fill, Russian political warfare, Chinese economic leverage, Iranian drones in the neighbourhood of NATO’s frontier. This is not theoretical. It’s in the communiqués Belgrade signs and the arrests Croatian police make.
I’m sharing this because the public deserves the full, documented picture. Intelligence sources have told me things I cannot independently verify; where the public record confirms them, I’ve said so; where it doesn’t, I haven’t. What is verified is already damning: a Belgrade-tethered party whose deputy leader took responsibility for an armed attack; a state that refuses accountability while deepening ties with Moscow; and Western custodians of “the process” who have abandoned first principles in favour of managing optics.
Kosovo is not perfect. But it is a democracy under sustained, hybrid pressure. The job of the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union is not to cajole the victim into “flexibility.” It is to deter the aggressor with consequences that mean something. Start there and the Balkans might finally exit Moscow’s shadow.
Democracy or Surrender: The Case Against Serbian List
Municipal elections scheduled for October have once again become a flashpoint in a conflict that never truly ended.
Partnerica hrvatskog pilota radila u međunarodnim misijama na Kosovu. Imala bliske veze s mnogim EULEX sucima i tužiteljima — VL.
Following the arrest of a Croatian pilot and his Serbian girlfriend on suspicion of espionage, the NATO mission in Kosovo, KFOR, has said that they take these allegations seriously, and that the integrity of classified information is paramount. — G Express.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the recent developments in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, including the situation in the northern municipalities in Kosovo — EU Parliament.
One Year After Banjska: The West’s Role in Serbia’s Balkan Escalation
One year after the Banjska attacks, Serbia's aggression and Western appeasement continue to destabilise Kosovo, raising questions about regional security and international accountability. — The GPC Balkan Watch.
Arrest of Croatian pilot and Serbian girlfriend on suspicion of spying for Serbia, KFOR: For any comments, we refer you to the Croats — G Express.
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2022 Communication on EU Enlargement policy — EU Comission.
France Arms Serbia, Ignoring Genocidal Past and Russian Ties
Macron arms Serbia's autocrat, ignoring its Russian ties and genocidal past, undermining European security and principles in a desperate bid for influence. — The GPC Balkan Watch.
Macron hopes to break Belgrade's ties to Moscow with fighter jets sale
Twelve aircraft are scheduled for delivery between 2028 and 2029. The French president praised a 'strategic change' likely to bring Serbia closer to the European Union. — Le Monde.
Russian Centre in Serbia Scorns Espionage Claims — Balkan Insight.
Russian paramilitary group Wagner reportedly opens 'cultural centre' in Belgrade — Intelli News.
Russia recruits Serbs in drive to replenish military forces in Ukraine
Anti-war whistleblowers leak list appearing to show plans to draft hundreds of Serbs to bolster Moscow’s armies — The Guardian.
Kosovo says 3 border police officers ‘kidnapped’ by Serbia; Belgrade says they crossed illegally — AP.
Kosovo to start trial for Banjska attack by Serb group: Why it matters
The indictment charges 45 suspects with ‘terrorism’ in connection with their alleged goal of annexing northern Kosovo to Serbia. — Al Jazeera.
Miroslav Lajcak: The Envoy Under Fire
Miroslav Lajcak’s tenure as EU Envoy to the Western Balkans is under scrutiny, with allegations of bias towards Serbia and ties to Russian interests. — The GPC I Unit.
Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: An Accounting — US Department of State Archives.
Kosovo: Rape as a Weapon of "Ethnic Cleansing" — Human Rights Watch [RefWorld].
THE BRUSSELS DIALOGUE BETWEEN KOSOVO AND SERBIA ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES — Balkan Policy Research Group.
The Security Council’s 7327th meeting (4 Dec 2014) on Kosovo reflects how, after the 2013 Brussels Agreement, Serb integration into Kosovo’s institutions became a central theme. UN Special Representative Farid Zarif highlighted the “politically courageous participation of Serbian majority municipalities” in elections and urged momentum towards the administrative integration of northern Kosovo and the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-majority municipalities under the April 2013 deal (p. 3). Serbia’s Prime Minister Vucic stressed Belgrade’s readiness to implement Brussels obligations but complained of delays in Pristina’s preparations for the Serb community structure and the incomplete integration of Serbian police personnel into Kosovo institutions (p. 7). Kosovo’s then–Prime Minister Thaçi, in turn, celebrated the participation of Serbs in national elections as proof that the “territorial integrity of Kosovo” was consolidated (pp. 12–13).
Taken together, the meeting record shows the EU-brokered process normalised Belgrade-linked Serb participation in Kosovo’s central institutions, even as both sides contested the pace and meaning of integration.— UNSC 7327th Meeting.