Why a Serbian State-Backed Media Network Is Expanding Into Poland
The danger is not a single television channel. It is the slow construction of an information architecture capable of reshaping political realities across Europe.
WARSAW — At first glance, NewsMax Polska appears designed to evoke a familiar American television format1. Its branding echoes a recognisable conservative media style, its presentation borrows heavily from United States cable news aesthetics, and its messaging often focuses on themes that resonate with Europe’s growing right-wing political movements.
Yet behind the channel’s Polish identity lies a corporate structure that stretches southward to Belgrade, placing it within a wider network of media assets connected to Serbia’s state-controlled telecommunications giant, Telekom Serbija2.
The expansion has prompted growing scrutiny among media analysts, policymakers and security researchers who see the acquisition of media outlets across Central and Eastern Europe as part of a broader struggle over information, political influence and strategic narratives in a region increasingly shaped by Russia’s war against Ukraine.
NewsMax Polska is published by Newsmax Gateway B.V., which operates under a corporate structure linked to NewsMax Balkans3. The network ultimately traces back to Telekom Serbija, whose largest shareholder is the Serbian state.
For years, Telekom Serbija has pursued an aggressive acquisition strategy, purchasing television stations, cable operators and media companies throughout the Balkans and beyond. The company’s expansion has frequently attracted attention because it has continued despite reporting substantial financial pressures and losses, leading critics to question whether commercial returns are the primary objective.
Analysts have increasingly compared the model to the transformation of Hungary’s media environment under Prime Minister Viktor Orban, where politically aligned ownership structures gradually reshaped the information landscape through acquisitions, consolidation and favourable state support4.
The arrival of Serbian-backed media ventures in Poland has drawn particular interest because of Poland’s strategic importance within Europe. As one of the European Union’s largest member states and one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Poland occupies a central position in the continent’s political and security architecture5.
Unlike several Balkan states, Poland has historically shown limited public sympathy toward Moscow. Public opinion polls consistently indicate strong support for Ukraine and widespread distrust of the Kremlin.
That reality raises an obvious question: why would media investments linked to Serbia focus attention on Poland, a country where openly pro-Russian narratives have historically gained little traction?
Part of the answer may lie in patterns previously documented by The Gunpowder Chronicles’ Information Warfare Desk through its reporting on Kosovo and the wider Western Balkans.
Over the past three years, The GC has documented repeated efforts by commentators, media personalities and self-described analysts appearing across Kosovan media ecosystems to reshape public understanding of the Kosovo war and the legacy of the Milosevic era. These narratives have ranged from attempts to shift responsibility for wartime atrocities onto Kosovo Albanians to efforts aimed at rehabilitating the image of Slobodan Milosevic, despite findings by international tribunals and extensive documentation of crimes committed by Serbian forces during the 1998-99 conflict6.
The reporting further identified recurring attempts to portray Kosovo’s state institutions as illegitimate and to frame lawful government actions as acts of oppression. Following the armed attack in Banjska in September 2023, when heavily armed Serbian militants engaged Kosovo Police in northern Kosovo, elements of the Kosovan media landscape sought to ridicule or dismiss Kosovo’s security response while downplaying the significance of the attack itself.
Similarly, efforts by Kosovo authorities to restore constitutional order in the north, dismantle parallel structures and enforce the rule of law were frequently depicted by some outlets as campaigns against the Serbian community. In several instances documented by The Gunpowder Chronicles, actions undertaken by Kosovo’s democratically elected government were rhetorically compared to persecution or even to the policies of the Milosevic era, despite the profound historical and factual differences between the two.
Taken individually, such narratives may appear isolated. Viewed collectively, however, they reveal a consistent pattern: the gradual reframing of facts, the erosion of trust in democratic institutions and the cultivation of alternative political realities favourable to Belgrade’s strategic interests.
It is this experience that makes developments in Poland particularly significant. If similar methods are being exported beyond the Western Balkans through media acquisitions and politically connected ownership structures, then Poland may represent more than a commercial opportunity. It may serve as a gateway into the broader information space of Central and Eastern Europe, where influence can be accumulated gradually through narrative shaping rather than direct political intervention.
In this interpretation, ownership of media assets provides more than commercial opportunities. It offers influence over editorial priorities, audience segmentation, political discourse and long-term narrative formation.
Such concerns have emerged against a backdrop of increasing anxiety about disinformation across Europe.
A recent Eurobarometer survey found that many Europeans believe they encounter false or misleading information regularly. The perception of exposure to disinformation has risen markedly in recent years, reflecting broader concerns about information warfare, foreign influence operations and political polarisation7.
Researchers studying disinformation have repeatedly noted that societies characterised by political division, fragmented media environments and declining trust in institutions tend to be more vulnerable to external influence campaigns.
Those concerns are especially pronounced in Central and Eastern Europe, where questions of national identity, historical memory and relations with Russia remain politically sensitive.
Serbia occupies a particularly complex position within this landscape.
While formally pursuing membership in the European Union, Belgrade has maintained close political, economic and cultural ties with Moscow. Serbia remains one of the few European countries that has declined to align fully with Western sanctions against Russia following the invasion of Ukraine.
The relationship has generated unease among some European policymakers, who increasingly view information operations as a critical component of geopolitical competition.
Whether Telekom Serbija’s media expansion represents a purely commercial strategy, an exercise in soft power, or something more politically ambitious remains the subject of debate.
What is less disputed is that media ownership itself has become a matter of national security concern across Europe.
Governments and regulators increasingly recognise that influence over information ecosystems can produce political effects that emerge gradually over years rather than through immediate electoral interventions.
The question facing policymakers is no longer whether media ownership carries geopolitical significance. It is how democracies should respond when strategic communications, commercial investment and political influence become difficult to separate.
For Poland and its neighbours, that debate is likely to intensify as competition over narratives becomes an increasingly important front in Europe’s broader confrontation with authoritarian influence.
US right-wing broadcaster Newsmax launches service in Poland — Notes from Poland
US far-right media to open Polish franchise with Serbian backing
Questions are growing over who is behind the project and what role it could play ahead of Poland’s parliamentary election — Euractiv
Newsmax Polska News Channel Launching Soon: “We Want to Find the Golden Mean in Reporting”
Following its successful regional expansion, Newsmax is continuing its growth across Europe with the launch of the new news channel Newsmax Polska, set to begin broadcasting in June. — NewsMax
AP: “How Hungary’s Orbán uses control of the media to escape scrutiny”
RSF: “Hungary: Orbán allies acquire regional press monopoly” — good for the consolidation/comparison argument.
IOG: Institute of Geoeconomics chapter on Hungary media control and disinformation
IJOC: article on parallels between Orbán and the American right
Intellinews: Polish public support for Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership drops sharply.
More in Common Ukraine polling PDF — this is a recent snapshot of support for Ukraine in Poland and allied countries.
Mieroszewski Centre report: “Ukraine as seen by Poles” — this is a reference with regards to the information-war angle and Polish public attitudes.
Euronews on the latest Eurobarometer disinformation survey — this reference supports the claim that Europeans see disinformation as a top concern.
European Federation of Journalists on the Eurobarometer results — this reference is useful for the broader media-ecosystem concern and concern about foreign influence.
European Interest summary of Eurobarometer findings — this reference is useful for the “many Europeans encounter misinformation” framing.