In this live discussion for Gunpowder Chronicles and our Eastern Front coverage, I examined Hungary’s political transition after the defeat of Viktor Orban and asked what it may mean for Europe, Ukraine and the Western Balkans.
I was joined by Péter Dósa, founder of The Hungary Report, and Olena Solodovnikova, a Kyiv-based journalist with whom I have reported on Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine since 2022. Olena has also documented national security issues and Russian atrocities on the ground.
Peter argued that Hungary’s shift was strategic, though not a total ideological rupture. In his view, Péter Magyar is moving the country back towards the EU and NATO and trying to repair the damage of Orban’s 16 years in power. But he stressed that democratic recovery would be slow.
“The real story begins now,” he said, referring to the challenge of rebuilding media freedom, institutional trust and democratic life inside Hungary.
When I asked what the change in leadership meant for Ukraine, Olena said Ukrainians had grown fatigued by Orban’s repeated attempts to obstruct support for Kyiv. She described his rhetoric as damaging and said many Ukrainians saw his conduct as directed more at foreign audiences than at any practical concern for peace. At the same time, she was careful not to overstate expectations about Magyar. Because he emerged from Fidesz, she said, he remained a figure to watch closely rather than trust automatically.
A central part of our discussion focused on Hungary’s dependence on Russian energy. Peter said this relationship had become deeply embedded in the state and economy, including through oil, gas and the Paks nuclear project. He noted that diversification would be politically and economically difficult and that Magyar himself had acknowledged Hungary would continue buying Russian energy for the foreseeable future.
“It’s going to be hard and it’s going to take a long time,” Peter said.
I also asked about recent revelations concerning contacts between Hungary’s former foreign minister and Sergei Lavrov, and what that meant for trust inside the EU and NATO. Peter said trust could not be restored quickly and would have to be earned through reform, transparency and anti-corruption measures. He argued that only sustained democratic change inside Hungary would persuade partners that Budapest had become reliable again.
On Ukraine’s EU path, Peter said Magyar appeared less confrontational than Orbán, but still cautious. He suggested Hungary was unlikely to continue acting as a spoiler in the same way, though it would not necessarily embrace fast-track accession for Ukraine. Olena, for her part, said Ukraine was working to meet the demands of European integration during wartime, but added that the scale and complexity of the country made accession a formidable task.
In the final part of the discussion, I turned to the Western Balkans and the overlap between Hungarian, Serbian and Russian influence. Peter described what he saw as a pattern of coordination among regional strongmen aligned with Moscow. Olena responded more broadly, saying that in moments of real danger, only a country’s own forces can truly defend its sovereignty.
