How a President Burned the House to Save the Seat
Osmani’s abrupt dissolution of Parliament isn't a constitutional remedy; it’s a calculated arson of the legislative branch to bypass a boycott her own allies provoked.
The political crisis that erupted in Kosovo in early March has exposed deep fractures in the country’s political system, raising questions about constitutional authority, electoral legitimacy and the balance of power between institutions.
In the space of less than twenty four hours, Kosovo moved from a failed parliamentary session to elect a president to a presidential decree dissolving parliament and calling new elections. The decision1 by President Vjosa Osmani has now triggered a constitutional dispute that may ultimately be decided by the Constitutional Court.
The crisis began on the evening of March 5, when the Assembly of Kosovo convened to initiate the process of electing the country’s next president. According to the constitution, the parliament must hold several rounds of voting to elect a head of state.
But the session collapsed before the process could even begin.
Only sixty six lawmakers were present in the chamber, all belonging to the governing coalition led by the Self Determination Movement, or Vetëvendosje. Opposition lawmakers from the Democratic Party of Kosovo, the Democratic League of Kosovo and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo refused to attend the session. Members of the Serbian List were also absent.
Without the presence of at least two thirds of the parliament’s one hundred and twenty deputies, the election procedure could not start.
The governing party had nominated the foreign minister, Glauk Konjufca, as its candidate for the presidency. Opposition parties demanded a consensus candidate but did not present a joint nominee.
The result was a procedural stalemate.
Early the following morning, March 6, President Osmani issued a decree dissolving parliament and sending the country toward new elections.
In a press conference announcing the decision, Osmani framed the move as a constitutional obligation.
“Deputies had twenty three days available to carry out this constitutional duty,” Osmani said. “They chose not to do so. The fact that the Assembly decided not to use the available days does not change our constitution and does not remove my duty to dissolve this Assembly.”
Publicly, the message from the president was straightforward. Responsibility for the crisis lay with lawmakers who failed to fulfil their constitutional obligation to elect a president.
But the political reality behind that statement is more complicated.
The crisis did not arise from a lack of votes for a specific candidate. It emerged from a political decision by opposition parties to block the process entirely by boycotting the session.
This distinction is central to understanding what unfolded inside the Assembly.
In practical terms, the opposition deployed the most powerful parliamentary tool available to it. A boycott.
Sadri Ramabaja, a political analyst who discussed the events with Gunpowder Chronicles described the situation as the “anatomy of a plot”.
“The Assembly failed to elect the president because the opposition boycotted the session and the required quorum could not be reached,” Ramabaja said. “This is a parliamentary tactic used frequently in parliamentary systems to block decisions. It does not automatically constitute a conspiracy, although there are clear signs that suggest the existence of one.”
Ramabaja noted that the government itself was not directly brought down by the crisis.
“The government did not fall,” he said. “But the country has entered a political and constitutional crisis.”
The government led by Prime Minister Albin Kurti, often referred to as Kurti Three, had been formed only weeks earlier, on February 11, 2026, following parliamentary elections held on December 28, 2025.
Those elections produced a decisive outcome. Vetëvendosje secured more than fifty one percent of the vote, a result widely interpreted as a strong popular endorsement of Kurti’s political project.
The party has framed its mandate as one aimed at consolidating Kosovo’s statehood and reducing the influence of Serbia within the country.
In a televised interview discussing the unfolding crisis, I argued that the events were not unexpected.
“First of all I want to say that this is not surprising,” I said during the broadcast. “Since Mr Kurti came to power in 2021 with a plebiscitary vote from the people of Kosovo, opposition parties have tried by every means to obstruct his leadership and his policies aimed at consolidating the state and breaking Kosovo free from Serbia’s influence.”
According to this interpretation, the boycott of the presidential vote represents part of a broader political struggle over Kosovo’s strategic direction.
“For twenty years those parties governed Kosovo and installed Serbian influence within the country,” I said during the interview. “They closed the Institute for the Documentation of Serbian Genocide in Kosovo and signed international agreements that allowed Serbia to attempt the creation of a Serbian entity inside Kosovo.”
I also pointed to the armed incident in northern Kosovo in September 2023, when Serbian backed militants attempted to destabilise the region.
“After these clandestine projects failed, Serbia attempted to annex the north of Kosovo on September 24, 2023,” I said. “That also failed.”
The boycott by opposition parties, I argued, fits into a broader pattern of attempts to obstruct the consolidation of Kosovo’s institutions.
Opposition leaders reject that interpretation.
Lumir Abdixhiku, the leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo, welcomed President Osmani’s decision to dissolve parliament.
“I support and welcome the decree and the position of the President of the Republic, Vjosa Osmani Sadriu, to dissolve the Assembly,” Abdixhiku said in a statement2.
“The Democratic League of Kosovo values the responsibility and constitutional clarity demonstrated in this decision in defence of the constitutional order and the normal functioning of the institutions of the Republic.”
Abdixhiku criticised what he described as attempts by the governing majority to impose unilateral control over state institutions.
“Political failure combined with dangerous tendencies of imposition and improvisation cannot produce artificial debates or procedural delays that would turn our republic into a country without norms and rules,” he said.
He added that his party was ready to participate in consultations on setting a date for new elections.
“In democracy the final word always belongs to the sovereign,” Abdixhiku said.
Bedri Hamza of the Democratic Party of Kosovo made similar claims.
“The PDK offered several alternatives to avoid elections and guarantee institutional stability,” Hamza said in a statement. “But the lack of willingness from the parliamentary majority to find a solution is pushing the country toward new elections.”
The governing party disputes those assertions.
During the televised discussion, I argued that the opposition’s actions had been predictable.
“The opposition parties together with the Serbian List refused to attend the parliamentary session with full awareness that they would block the election of the president,” I said.
According to that analysis, the crisis was not merely a procedural breakdown but part of a larger political confrontation.
The situation escalated further after President Osmani issued the decree dissolving parliament.
Several constitutional law experts immediately questioned the legality of the decision.
Among the most prominent critics was Enver Hasani, a constitutional law scholar.
“This decree is entirely unconstitutional and strikes the foundations of the constitutional order,” Hasani said in comments reported by KosovaPress3.
He argued that dissolving parliament under these circumstances would effectively alter the nature of Kosovo’s political system.
“What happened today changes the form of state power from a parliamentary system to a presidential system,” Hasani said. “Such a change can only be made through a constitutional amendment.”
Hasani also warned that the decree could not produce legal consequences.
“No legal consequence can arise from the violation of the thirty day deadline,” he said.
He urged the Constitutional Court to intervene quickly.
“This arbitrary decree must be challenged and the Constitutional Court must have the final word,” Hasani said. “The court should urgently impose a temporary measure to prevent further erosion of the constitutional order.”
The Constitutional Court now stands at the centre of the crisis.
Its ruling could determine whether the presidential decree remains in force or whether the parliamentary process to elect a president must resume.
During the television interview I suggested that the court might indeed overturn the decree.
“The Constitutional Court may return the decree because it is illegal,” I said. “The president had no right to dissolve parliament before the Assembly completed the second and third rounds of the presidential election process.”
In that view, the decree represents not simply a legal misinterpretation but a potentially political act.
“It sounds more like a coup attempt against the election results of December 28, 2025 than a constitutional implementation,” I said during the interview.
The dispute has also revealed tensions between President Osmani and Prime Minister Kurti.
Once close political allies, the two leaders now appear increasingly distant.
Asked about the rift during the broadcast, I suggested that Vetëvendosje itself must explain why it did not openly support Osmani for a second presidential term.
“It is the responsibility of Vetëvendosje to be transparent with the public and explain why President Osmani was not their preferred candidate,” I said.
The governing party instead nominated Konjufca while saying it would support Osmani if she secured backing from opposition parties.
“If the president had the votes of the opposition, Vetëvendosje said it would vote for her,” I told the Albanian National broadcaster.
In the absence of such support, the party advanced its own candidate.
The broader geopolitical context also shapes the debate.
During the interview I criticised what I described as political manoeuvring involving Albania’s prime minister Edi Rama.
“President Osmani used her diplomatic relations to help Mr Rama move closer to Donald Trump,” I said. “This is scandalous when Mr Rama has used every mechanism of the Albanian state to undermine Kosovo.”
The remarks reflect the intense and often polarised political discourse that now surrounds Kosovo’s internal politics.
For the moment the country’s immediate future rests with the Constitutional Court.
If the court annuls the decree, the Assembly could resume the presidential election process. If it upholds the decision, Kosovo will head toward new parliamentary elections.
Either way the events of early March have revealed the fragility of Kosovo’s institutional balance.
Nearly two decades after independence, the young republic still finds itself navigating the difficult path between democratic procedure, political rivalry and the unresolved pressures of regional geopolitics.
And as the crisis unfolds, the central question remains unresolved.
Will Kosovo’s political system emerge stronger from this confrontation, or will constitutional crises continue to shape the country’s democratic trajectory.
President Vjosa Osmani’s Press Conference, March 6, 2026.
Lumir Abdixhiku’s Facebook Statement, March 6, 2026.
